

# Forever the Unknown: The Lujo Virus Experience in Johannesburg

## Prof. Adriano Duse, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

### A Webber Training Teleclass

**Forever the Unknown: The Lujo Virus Experience in Johannesburg**  
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Hosted by Paul Webber  
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- ### Some African Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers...
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers transmitted by mosquitoes
    - Yellow Fever
    - Rift Valley Fever
  - Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers transmitted by ticks
    - [Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever]
  - Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers transmitted by rodents
    - Lassa Fever
    - Other arenaviruses, e.g. Lujo virus
  - Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers with bats as reservoirs
    - Ebola Virus Hemorrhagic Fever
    - Marburg Virus Hemorrhagic Fever

- ### Wide Differential Diagnosis!
- Bacterial septicemia: streptococcal, staphylococcal, typhoid, gram-negatives (from meningococci to bacilli – common e.g. *S typhi* to unusual e.g. *Capnocytophaga*),
  - Rickettsial infections: e.g. tick-bite fever
  - Spirochetal infections: e.g. leptospirosis
  - Parasitic infections: e.g. malaria
  - Other viral infections: fulminant hepatitis A & B, systemic herpesvirus infections, hemorrhagic Varicella zoster, hemorrhagic measles, etc.
  - Non-infective causes: neoplasia, drug sensitivities, anticoagulants, snake-bite, glue sniffing, traditional medicines, agricultural & industrial chemicals

- ### General Principles 1:
- VHF are an uncommon cause of fever & bleeding: need to always maintain high index of suspicion
  - Laboratory confirmation takes time (in this outbreak: 12 Sept 08 > 10 Oct 08)
  - Nosocomial transmission and outbreak amplification among HCWs of most (except RVF) African VHF agents is well-described
    - Failure to strictly adhere to barrier precautions: contact with infectious blood, (other) tissues, excreta and other body fluids
    - Sharps and splash injuries
    - Mechanical aerosolization of infectious particles


- ### General Principles 2:
- All previously listed VHF agents are labile, lipid-enveloped RNA viruses & readily killed by simple disinfection: 2% clear phenolic (Hycolin); 1% Na-hypochlorite (bleach); ~ 1% peracetic acid
  - Survival, particularly in blood samples, and blood and body fluid encrustations on medical devices & environmental surfaces is variable (days-weeks!)

- ### General Principles 3:
- Adhere to simple & realistic IP&C precautions at all times
    - Then, tailor them to (inferred) knowledge of mode of transmission & biological behavior and characteristics of the infectious agent (or, if novel, an appropriate surrogate). Compile line-listing / an epidemic curve. ENSURE THAT DRESSING/DONNING OF PPE IS AS SIMPLE AS POSSIBLE!
  - Do not de-escalate IP&C precautions on the basis of an initial negative RT-PCR; only do so when (i) a definitive diagnosis is reached, or (ii) patient is discharged, or (iii) patient is dead
  - Beware of transient 'spontaneous improvement' noted in patient!

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## Disadvantages To Complex High-Level Containment Approaches:

- Systems may hinder patient care e.g. Racial respirators
- Personnel must be trained to function safely & effectively
- Expensive
- NOT AVAILABLE TO PRIMARY & SECONDARY HCWs WHO ARE (OFTEN) THE FIRST TO HAVE CONTACT WITH A SUSPECTED VHF CASE
- Paradoxically may increase the risk of exposure (parenteral & other).

## General Principles 4:

- Limit Staff exposure. (Ideally) dedicate senior, willing, and more experienced Staff as far as possible. Keep nursing shifts short (4 hours)
- Warn and educate all relevant personnel involved in HC delivery. Do not forget auxiliary services, including the laboratory
- Limit laboratory tests to the minimum & negotiate times of processing of samples
  - FBC, Hb, platelets, coagulation studies
  - LFTs: ALT & AST only
  - Blood cultures, CSF, & peripheral blood smears mandatory (& other, if indicated)
  - Serological and viral investigations
  - Other tests: discuss & arrange with Laboratory

## General Principles 5:

- Set up a representative & suitably qualified outbreak response Team. Avoid: (i) impracticalities, (ii) multiple policies, and (iii) mixed messages – National, Regional and Local experts must all be on the same track
- Define and classify (high-, medium-, low-risk) and identify contacts (contact tracing) and monitor appropriately ('surveillance quarantine') - 21 days after last contact
- Implement social mobilization and education of general public and ACCURATE, HONEST, RESPONSIBLE information via the media – establish a hotline and an operations centre

## General Principles 6:

- Continuously EVALUATE efficacy of IP&C interventions introduced – accept you may be wrong. Either way, criticism & judgment are inevitable!
- Beware of case definitions that are too wide and of denominators that are incorrectly defined. Does it all make biological & epidemiologic sense?
- Strict enforcement of port health regulations in patient transfer across international border is required
- Remember each outbreak has its own peculiarities: clinical; biological; personal vs. political vs. public health agendas; public health-related deficiencies, etc.

## VHF Isolation Precautions In a Nutshell:

- Isolation of the patient (negative-pressure cubicles generally unavailable)
- Reinforcement of standard & contact precautions
- Enhanced VHF PPE – contact precautions to include aerosols, i.e. skin & mucous membrane protection
- Safe disinfection of spills, equipment & supplies (do not alter hospital cleaning & disinfection policies on basis of 'perceived' risk. Rather ensure that they are strictly enforced)
- Monitoring – from 'cradle-to-grave' of disposal of medical hazardous waste
- Thorough terminal cleaning and decontamination of patient's room, medical equipment used, etc.
- Safe handling (esp. 'last offices') and burial of corpses
- Education to family members & advice regarding sexual activity to patient & intimate partner


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### Arenaviruses:

- Negative-sense single stranded RNA viruses; most cause chronic infection in rodents (reservoirs) & excreted from urine; > 20 species identified
- Human transmission: from contaminated food / household items / ? dust; and contact with infected blood & body fluids
- Classified as: (i) Old World (prototype: lymphocytic chorio-meningitis (LCM) virus. Africa: Lassa fever; Ippy, Mobala & Morogoro - not pathogenic in humans; & (ii) New World arenaviruses. South America: e.g. Junin; Machupo, etc.



Courtesy:  
Dr L Blumberg

On Sunday, 26 January 1969, Laura Wine died at the Bingham Hospital in Jos, Nigeria, the first recorded victim of a vicious new killer virus – Lassa Fever. Eight days later the nurse who had attended her, Charlotte Shaw, began to notice severe back and leg pains and a slight headache. Her temperature rose alarmingly quickly. A macular rash discoloured the skin of her face, neck and arms. Strange ulcers appeared in her throat, swellings, then a marked drop in blood pressure – in eleven days she, too, was dead. When another nurse, Penny Pinneo, developed similar symptoms shortly afterwards, it was decided to make

### Lassa Fever: The High Price Of Poor Medical Practice

- 1989: 2 hospital outbreaks in Imo State (southern central Nigeria) *BMJ* 1995;311:857-859
  - Among 34 cases: 20 patients, 6 nurses, 2 surgeons, 1 physician, son of a patient (65% mortality)
  - Most cases exposed in hospitals (attack rate in one hospital 55%)
  - Both hospitals inadequately equipped & staffed, with poor medical practice: parenteral drug rounds with sharing of syringes fuelled the epidemic; staff infected during emergency surgery and during health care delivery

### The Novel Old-World Arenavirus ('Lujo' v) Outbreak in RSA: September-October 08:

- Nosocomial outbreak following transportation of primary case from Zambia to South Africa
- Epicenter: Private hospital in Sandton, Gauteng
- Primary case: Safari tour agent (1)
- Secondary cases: Paramedic (2), nurse (3), cleaner (4)
- Tertiary case: Nurse (5)

### Case Definitions:

Suspected case :

- Acute onset of documented fever (an oral temperature  $\geq 38^{\circ}\text{C}$ , or axillary temperature of  $\geq 37.5^{\circ}\text{C}$ )

AND

- Has a history of direct/close contact with one of the confirmed arenaviral cases in the current cluster (in the 21 days after the onset of illness in these cases)

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### Case Definitions:

- Probable case:
  - A suspected case
  - History of a direct contact with one of the confirmed arenaviral cases, PLUS ONE OR MORE of the following:
    - Thrombocytopenia - presence of small skin and mucous membrane hemorrhages (petechiae) OR a platelet count of  $150-100 \times 10^9 / L$ , AND/OR
    - Raised transaminases: AST  $\geq 100$  u/l & ALT  $\geq 100$  u/l, AND/OR
    - Organ (or multi-organ) failure
    - Evidence of bleeding

### Case Definitions:

A confirmed case is determined by definitive positive laboratory tests for Arenavirus, as confirmed and reported by the NICD & collaborating partners

### Summary Of Case Histories:

- Primary case (Case 1)
  - 33-year-old female
  - Safari-booking agent resident in Lusaka
  - Arrived at a Sandton private hospital in South Africa (air- evacuated) for medical care on 12 September 2008
  - Critically ill, with diagnosis of (& treated for) African tick-bite fever (eschar noted on R foot)
  - Died 14 September 2008
  - Source of infection undetermined

### Case Histories - Secondary Cases:

- Case 2
  - 33-year-old male; Paramedic
  - Cared for primary patient (1) during air evacuation
  - Performed procedures such as nebulization, suctioning & manual ventilation of patient
  - A second paramedic (admitted for observation at the Sandton private hospital), responsible for ambulance transport of patient from airport to the hospital, stated that his colleague wore 'minimal' PPE & had described soiling with patient excreta on his forearms as he delivered care during air evacuation
  - Admitted on 27 September 2008 and died 2 October 2008

### Case Histories - Secondary Cases:

- Case 3
  - 34-year-old female
  - Nurse
  - Cared for primary case (1) in intensive care unit
  - Nature of contact uncertain but had attended to, and cleaned the body of, primary case (1)
  - Admitted to a private hospital (Sir Albert Medical Centre) on 1 October 2008 and died on 5 October 2008

### Case Histories - Secondary Cases:

- Case 4
  - 38-year-old female
  - Hospital Cleaner
  - Performed terminal cleaning of ICU room of primary case (1)
  - Cleaning *allegedly* involved spray washing of walls
  - Went to 2 public facilities (first, seen at CHBH and subsequently admitted to Leratong Hospital) then transferred and admitted to CMJAC VHF isolation unit on 5 October 2008
  - Died 6 October 2008

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
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## Case histories - tertiary case:


- Case 5
  - 47-year-old female
  - Nursing sister
  - Cared for paramedic (2)
  - Involved in traumatic insertion of central venous catheter
  - Became ill on 9 September 2008 and admitted to the Sandton private hospital on the 10 September 2008
  - Condition serious but stable
  - Treated with first oral then IV ribavirin
  - Discharged on 2 December 2009. Only survivor!

## Exposures:


- Paramedic (2): was witnessed to have turned the primary case (1) without gloves in a Zambian hospital, prior to air evacuation - PIV dislodged & several drops of blood fell onto bed-sheet
- Cases 1-4: initially managed without special PPE (gloves donned when blood samples were collected and plastic apron worn) – HCWs & cleaners were potentially exposed to contaminated bedding, excreta & vomitus
- No known needle-stick / splash injuries were recorded
- Only case 5 was managed with full PPE, after which no further cases occurred



## Chain Of Transmission:



## Follow- up Of Contacts (n~185):




## Functions Of The IP&C Team:

- Development of case & contact definitions & case assessment forms
- IP&C policy formulation
- IP&C audits of all facilities where suspected/confirmed cases were seen / admitted
- Assessment of suspected cases
- Manning of the VHF Ward at CMJAC
- Education about arenaviruses & training in correct use of PPE: Port Health, EMS personnel, HCWs & Laboratory personnel (> 1024 p)
- Counseling
- Distribution of PPE
- Monitoring of contacts at CMJAH & NHLS laboratories
- Laboratory biosafety
- Waste disposal audits

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<b>THE NEXT FEW TELECLASSES</b>	
29 Jul. 10	(Free Teleclass) Addressing Infection Prevention & Control in Low Resource Settings: The IFIC Approach Speaker: Dr. Michael Borg, St. Luke's Hospital, Malta
12 Aug. 10	(Free Teleclass) Positive Deviance: Unleashing Secret Change Agents in Your Hospital to Prevent MRSA Infection Speaker: Dr. Jon Lloyd, Plexus Institute
02 Sep. 10	(Free South Pacific Teleclass ... Live Broadcast from the NDICN Conference, New Zealand) Measuring the Impact of Infection Control Speaker: Dr. Leo Celli, Harvard Medical School
09 Sep. 10	Planning for Infectious Disease Disasters in Ambulatory Care Centers Speaker: Terri Rebman, Centers for the Study of Bioterrorism and Emerging Infections
16 Sep. 10	Lessons Learned From the Canadian Listeriosis Outbreak Speaker: Dr. Franco Pagotto, Health Canada

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